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Abstract
The development of larger technical systems relies on the coordination of auton-
omous action of a multitude of individuals and organizations. Institutional
settings, often neglected in the analysis of technical development, help to
achieve such coordination. Our analysis of international technical standardiza-
tion in telecommunications highlights an institutionalized process aiming at
the creation of compatibility standards as the means for coordination. Formal
procedural, membership, and decision rules combined with informal sets of
expectations constitute the normative basis of the CCITT, the most prominent
international standardization organization in telecommunications. Although
scientific, political and economic aspects can be equally important for standards,
the CCITT selectively legitimizes a technical perspective. Political and scientific
reasoning is restricted, an open economic perspective even completely banned,
unless they can be "translated" into a technical perspective. This increases the
capacity to proceed on a consensusal basis and often facilitates reaching a con-
sensus in a controversy. Standardization of Videotex and Telefax empirically
examplifies this, and at the same time demonstrates the limits of pure technical
reasoning to resolve genuine political or economic conflicts.
* * * * *
Die Entwicklung großer technischer Systeme hängt von der Koordination auto-
nomer Handlungen einer Vielzahl von Individuen und Organisationen ab.
Institutionelle Arrangements, oft vernachlässigt in Analysen technischer Ent-
wicklung, erleichtern dies. Unsere Analyse internationaler technischer Standar-
disierung in der Telekommunikation behandelt den Prozeß der Vereinbarung
von Kompatibilitätsstandards, die Koordination ermöglichen. Formale Mitglied-
schafts-, Entscheidungs- und Verfahrensregeln sowie informelle Erwartungs-
muster bilden die normative Grundlage der Arbeit des CCITT, der wichtigsten
internationalen Standardisierungsorganisation in der Telekommunikation. Ob-
wohl wissenschaftliche, politische und ökonomische Aspekte gleich wichtig sein
können für Standards, begünstigt der CCITT selektiv eine technische Perspekti-
ve. Politische und wissenschaftliche Argumentation ist nur eingeschränkt zuläs-
sig, eine offensichtlich ökonomische Sichtweise sogar völlig unzulässig, es sei
denn eine "Übersetzung" in eine technische Perspektive gelingt. Dies verbessert
die Möglichkeit, auf Konsensbasis zu arbeiten, und erleichtert oft die Einigung
in Kontroversen. Die Standardisierung von Bildschirmtext und Telefax liefert
hierfür empirische Beispiele und zeigt gleichzeitig die Grenzen rein technischer
Argumentation auf, um politische oder ökonomische Konflikte zu lösen.
Schmidt, Werle: Controversy in Standardization 3
Contents*
Abstract 2
1. Introduction 5
2. Social constructivism and institutional differentiation 6
3. Institutionalized types of reasoning, committees and conflict
resolution 11
4. Institutionalized technical reasoning in international
standardization 15
5. Controversies: Some Illustrations 21
5.1 Interactive Videotex 22
5.2 Telefax 25
6. Conclusion 29
References 31
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 4S/EASST joint meeting
in Gothenburg, August 12-15, 1992, in the "Scientific Controversy" section. For
helpful comments we wish to thank Jaap Jelsma, Renate Mayntz, Arie Rip, Fritz
W. Scharpf, Uwe Schimank and Helmut Voelzkow. We received technical assi-
stance from Doris Oelerich. The paper draws on research, which is partly fi-
nanced by the German Federal Minister of Research and Technology.
4 MPIFG Discussion Paper 93/5
Schmidt, Werle: Controversy in Standardization 5
1. Introduction
Technology is often perceived as a link or an interface between the scientific
and the economic sphere. Technical developments follow rules of economic
efficiency as well as principles of scientific exploration and research. Moreover,
central to technology is technical reasoning, which entails autonomous technolo-
gy-related rules of argumentation and evaluation. Together with the stock of
technological knowledge, these abstract rules constitute the crucial cognitive
elements of the professional domain of engineers and technicians.
The significance of scientific, technical, political and economic factors in the
course of technical development is difficult to approach, both in theoretical and
empirical terms. Efforts to conceptually and analytically distinguish the different
factors have to consider that they are intertwined albeit their boundaries are
negotiable. The non-transparent nature of technical work constitutes a high
barrier for social scientists who want to scrutinize its features instead of treating
technology as a black box.
In modern industrial societies R&D departments and laboratories in firms and
companies appear to be the most relevant locus of technical developments. The
more their endeavor aims at constructing larger technical systems, the more
collaboration and coordination between firms and other actors is needed. Tech-
nical development here relates to the joint specification of technical components,
the common definition of interface characteristics or the consensual approval
of security and safety requirements. Multilateral negotiations as well as collec-
tive standardization within specialized organizations are such coordinative
means. Technical standardization in particular provides an opportunity to ap-
proach both institutional and coordinative aspects of technical development.
Here, not market processes, but highly institutionalized committee-based proce-
dures establish an arena in which explicit debates from technical, economic or
scientific perspectives take place. Some of them can be observed and examined
more easily than the activities in R&D laboratories.
In this paper we refer to standardization processes in telecommunications at
an international level.1 We concentrate our empirical argument on the CCITT,
the most prominent and relevant international "producer" of telecommunica-
tions standards. Though dominated by engineers and officially confined to
technical reasoning, non-technical arguments have never been completely elimi-
1 Our empirical research project on international standardization in telecommuni-
cations focusses on three cases: interactive videotex, facsimile and electronic mail
(X.400) standardization. For the conceptual framework and the theoretical per-
spective of this project, see Schmidt/ Werle (1992a).
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nated in this organization. In addition to standardization activities at a national
level, political interests and controversies are likely to emerge in an internation-
al context because the implementation of standards partly relies on national
political support or control. The mixture of motives creates problems of institu-
tional overload, triggers hidden discourses and sometimes, though not always,
makes it difficult to reach a consensus in standardization committees. We shall
exemplify this empirically by presenting standardization cases from the CCITT.
At the same time we will show that an explanation of technical developments,
especially in the case of large technological systems, has to take institutional
settings and rules into account - a requirement that has been widely neglected
in constructivist approaches.
2. Social constructivism and institutional differentiation
Technical standards, like technical artifacts, are socially constructed. They result
from collective efforts to - at least in an official institutional interpretation -
coordinate the development, the construction and the implementation of techni-
cal components in order to make more comprehensive systems work. Individual
motives and interests for participating in standardization can differ from the
official understanding, but standards remain conventions entailing an inherent
expectation of compliance. When compliance cannot be policed and enforced,
consensus in the process of standard setting becomes a necessary (but not suffi-
cient) condition for a standard to gain significance in technical development,
where the standard functions as an "institutionalized feedback" of the develop-
ment and application of technology (Weingart 1988: 158).
Social constructivism, as an approach to explaining technological
developments, was "officially" introduced into social theory by Pinch and Bijker
some ten years ago (Pinch/ Bijker 1984). Employing concepts like "interpretative
flexibility" and "social mechanisms of termination" or "closure", which are de-
rived from the empirical programme of relativism in the sociology of scientific
knowledge, the constructivist approach can demonstrate convincingly that the
"linear model" of technological innovation processes is inadequate. There is no
inherent rationality in technological development. Therefore the question why
some technologies succeed and others fail moves into the core of constructivist
analysis. In an evolutionary process of variation and selection, technology’s
development is shaped by "relevant social groups", which include "institutions
and organizations (such as the military or some specific industrial company)
as well as organized or unorganized groups of individuals" (Pinch/ Bijker 1984:
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414). Their images of technology, originating from different perspectives and
interests, are crucial for the profile and the function of an artifact. In this ap-
proach even the technical "working" or "non-working" of an artifact no longer
appears as inherent in technology but contingent on social perception.
It was not long before this approach was subjected to criticism, especially with
regard to the manner in which it introduced and treated the "relevant social
groups". Their "structural location" in society, which largely determines their
relationship and access to each technology, was seen to be widely neglected.
Neither was consideration taken of the fact that "outcomes are produced in
specific arenas in a context of economic imperatives, government industrial
politics, regulations, legal duties and constraints, political strategies and tactics,
bureaucratic procedures and cultural traditions" (Russell 1986: 336). Though
this criticism cannot be extended in an equal manner to all constructivist studies
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, its general thrust has remained valid.2 The
studies tend to treat political, economic, technical or scientific factors as inter-
meshed and neither on the institutional nor on the individual (cognitive and
perceptive) level clearly distinguishable.
The argumentation of the technological systems approach in constructivism,
inspired by research into the history of technology, is similar in kind. "System
builders", as Tom Hughes puts it, never respected "knowledge categories or
professional boundaries". In order to create technological complexes they incor-
porated "such seemingly foreign actors as legislators and financiers, if they
could functionally contribute to the system building goal" (Hughes 1986: 285-
287). Pinch/ Bijker’s "relevant social groups" constitute a horizontally interacting
ensemble constructing the artifact - typically a "stand alone" device. Network
and/or market modes of coordination seem to prevail, and little deliberate
coordination seems to be necessary. Hughes’ "system builder" creates a techno-
logical system, such as an electric light and power system, with many compo-
nents that have to match the system requirements. The social construction of
a technological system through a "system builder" relies on hierarchical coordi-
nation while simultaneously integrating different factors and perspectives.3
"One of the primary characteristics of a system builder is the ability to construct
unity from diversity" (Hughes 1987: 52).
2 Especially the "actor-network" variant of the social constructivist approach, which
describes socio-technical configurations as heterogeneous networks of human
actors and artificial (artifact-) actors, rigorously ignores institutional meso and
macro structures of society (e.g. Callon 1986).
3 Chandler, from a different point of view, argues similarly (Chandler 1977).
8 MPIFG Discussion Paper 93/5
From empirical studies of the development of large technological systems,
however, we learn that the different factors are typically processed in a sequen-
tial and not in a simultaneous pattern, and that they can be distinguished over
a period of time. Hughes’ own historical comparison of electricity systems in
different countries, for example, demonstrates a pattern of development in
which initially entrepreneurial efforts dominate. In a next step, these efforts
are followed by system design activities of engineers trying to solve technical
problems and remove bottlenecks during the period of rapid growth. Later,
managers and financiers settle problems associated with rationalization and
capital intensification, and in the phase of geographical expansion across re-
gions and nations political intervention and regulation is triggered. The differ-
ent phases sometimes overlap and backtrack, and they include technical as well
as economic or social factors (Hughes 1987).
At least larger technological systems display a pattern of differentiation that
rules out conceiving them as seamless webs or tightly meshed actor networks.4
Therefore, following Burns/ Dietz, we conceptualize them as socio-technical
systems with analytically clear, but not rigidly defined lines of differentia-
tion.5 On the one hand we have "complex technical and physical structures
that are designed to produce or transform certain things (or to enable such
production)" including rules that specify the purposes of the technology and
its appropriate applications. On the other hand these systems comprise "social
institutions, legal orders and organizing principles designed to structure and
regulate the activities of the human beings engaged in disposing and operating
the technology", with different agents and organizations owning and managing
parts of the system, as well as different occupations, professions and bodies
of knowledge being involved (Burns/ Dietz 1992: 209).
Social institutions and the corresponding "orientation complexes" (Weingart
1984) shape technological development by providing a normative and cognitive
frame, a specific rationality of action, and often also an arena, in which institu-
tionally defined and invoked relevant actors create and decide upon different
options or paths of development. They create opportunities and constraints,
which channel but do not determine individual action. Complex societies have
a multitude of political, economic and other social institutions. Their emergence
and stability can be explained as socially "constructed". This does not mean,
4 As long as the materialized technology alone is examined, it depends on the
researcher’s perspective whether a technology is treated as a single artifact or
a system. (With respect to the car, for instance, see Soerensen 1991).
5 This concept is much broader than the organization-related notion of the Tavi-
stock-group (Emery/ Trist 1960).
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however, that theories of technological development can neglect their existence
or reduce it to a mere feature of social groups or some individual actors (see
Langlois 1986: 235-253).6 The most appropriate strategy for revealing the signif-
icance of institutions is comparative research. The introduction of interactive
videotex in Western Europe in the 1980s provides one of the very few examples
of a systematic comparison of institutional settings with respect to their influ-
ence on the "success or failure" of this new telecommunications system (Schnei-
der et al. 1991; Mayntz/ Schneider 1988).7
Sociological macro-theories in the tradition of Max Weber and Talcott Parsons
emphasize the relationship of societal modernization, functional differentiation
and institutionalization, and they point to the influence of institutions on indi-
vidual and collective action (see Lepsius 1977). Some of them also propose
typologies of (functional) differentiation. Extending Parsons’ famous A-G-I-L
typology, Luhmann advances an "open" concept of differentiation which does
not a priori restrict the number of functional subsystems to four. He rather
treats politics, science, religion, education, law, economy and some other social
spheres as "outdifferentiated" functional systems (Luhmann 1984; 1986; 1990).
Luhmann refers to evolutionary concepts in order to "explain" their emergence
and development, but he does not clearly specify the conditions of their emer-
gence, selection and stabilization. In every subsystem, communication - the
elementary unit of social systems - has a specific binary code, entails criteria
for the selection and assessment of adequate operations, and provides basic
substantive decision-rules. In the economy, for example, communication refers
to payments, profits, investments, costs, etc., whereas scientific communication
is centred on research programs, "theories" and explanations using the
true/false distinction as a pervasive criterion. Functional subsystems display
features of "autonomous closedness" and "self-referentiality". Communication,
however, can rapidly switch from the economic to the political, or from the
political to the scientific code (Luhmann 1986: 87).
For heuristic purposes Luhmann’s concept of functional differentiation appears
rather attractive because it is not very difficult to correspondingly classify many
social institutions as essentially political, economic, scientific, etc.. Basic econom-
ic institutions encompass markets, patent rights and business firms; in the polity
6 As is demonstrated in a newly published volume, "constructivists" still have
problems in recognizing the difference between individual actions or strategies
and institutions. In a postscript the editors cautiously introduce the concept of
institutions showing an initial comprehension similar to our understanding. In
their line of argumentation, however, they lose contact with institutions, prefer-
ring to speak of structures (Law/ Bijker 1992: 299-306).
7 We will refer to the specific role of international videotex standardization later.
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constitutions, election systems and regime-like systems of international treaties,
including international organizations, are examples of institutions; and in sci-
ence one finds scientific associations, research programs or universities.
Institutions contextualize situations providing specific rationalities of action,
which we prefer to call perspectives. According to the lines of functional and
institutional differentiation, different perspectives can be analytically distin-
guished. Empirically not every perspective is equally likely to prevail in relation
to the "shaping" of technology. In the special case of international coordination
of technological development through standardization, we suggest political,
economic and scientific perspectives are prevalent. In addition, an institutionally
activated technical perspective, hedged through formal and informal norms
and rules, comes to the fore.
Social theories of functional differentiation, but also the sociology of science
and economic theories, have some problems dealing with technology, techno-
logical knowledge and functional technical subsystems. Abundant discussions
on the relation of technology to either science or economy, concerning such
properties as basic principles and operations, social organization, function or
autonomy, only demonstrate that technology has a two-fold relationship to
them. From Luhmann’s perspective the degree of systemness of technology is
not as high as that of (other) functional subsystems (Luhmann 1990: 259-267;
see also Barnes/ Edge 1982). But neither he nor many other authors would
deny that we can find many elements distinguishing technology from the other
spheres.8 An institutionalization of a distinctive technical perspective through
professionalization and organization of a specific knowledge base contributes
to the social stabilization of a partly autonomous technical sphere. Its institu-
tional manifestations include professional associations, engineering communities
and technological paradigms (see Weingart 1984), but also, as we will see,
standardization organizations.
Individual perspectives on technology are often shaped through professional
socialization. Engineers certainly differ in their views from politicians, scientists
or business managers. When they talk about technology, professionals tend to
introduce and generalize their respective concepts of technical artifacts and
systems, which include references to actors, principles, specific issues and insti-
tutions. These comprehensive concepts constitute the basis for specific types
8 Renate Mayntz explicitly argues for the inclusion of large technical systems as
functional subsystems: "Funktionssysteme" (Mayntz 1988; 1993). See also Werle
(1990: 23-26).
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of reasoning on technology. We distinguish four types: technical, political,
scientific and economic reasoning.
3. Institutionalized types of reasoning, committees and conflict resolution
In the real world, no type of reasoning exists in its pure form. Many actors and
organizations mix them, or they can switch from one to another.9 We can easily
imagine a situation, in which a debate on religious, scientific or economic issues
is being held in a circle of engineers. In this context, engineers engage in the
respective type of reasoning.10 On the other hand, it is especially those organi-
zations and institutions which are designed to decide upon conflicting positions
that typically maintain rules and mechanisms which aim to attain a certain
degree of "purity" of reasoning. Too much diversity in reasoning seems to result
in heterogeneity overload which impedes the ability to decide.
The predominance of a specific type of reasoning in a given social constellation
does, of course, not preclude that the actors have conflicting ideas, opinions
and interests in a specific subject. This was demonstrated more than thirty years
ago when a large CCITT study group discussed a standard for data modems
for the telephone network. Most of the participants of the meeting either repre-
sented companies in the data processing industry or were delegated from tele-
phone network operators. Both groups’ perceptions of the problem and the
proposed solutions were so different that the meeting "turned into a somewhat
theatralic clash of two cultures", as a participant recalls (Wallenstein 1990: xiii).
Yet, issues, problems and conflicts that continue to reappear will be of a certain
type. In a controversy on such subjects actors will use a common terminology,
apply similar rules and criteria and refer to shared principles.
9 Weyer (1989) shows that strategic switching can be used to forge coalitions ("hy-
brid communities") between actors from different social subsystems.
10 From this point of view, the argument that for fruitful controversy studies it is
necessary "to discard mainstream images of science" (Brante/ Hallberg 1991: 390)
does not sound convincing. Why should we call a controversy scientific, when
in a public debate scientists reason morally or politically using their general
prestige as scientific experts to give their arguments a higher weight (see Miller
1992)? Such a controversy could as well be interpreted as a "jurisdictional con-
flict" (Abbott 1988) in which different professions struggle for more influence
in their society, in order to enlarge their jurisdictional domain. This, then, is
clearly a political conflict.
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Functionally specialized social institutions reinforce this tendency. They consti-
tute the normative basis of organizations, some of which have been explicitly
established to enable conflict resolution or early coordination of diverging
positions.11 These organizations as such do not prevent conflicts from emerg-
ing, neither do they automatically resolve them. They rather channel conflicts,
providing formal and informal procedural rules that are supposed to facilitate
a consistent ("pure") type of reasoning on a certain subject. In other words,
through these rules an abstraction from other than the formally "authorized"
arguments is achieved. The organizations are not, or only in a minor part,
corporate actors, acting on behalf of a constituency. Rather they constitute an
arena or a system of arenas, in which individual or corporate actors congregate
in order to gain information and orientations, coordinate actions and process
controversial matters.
Courts as well as committees are examples of such organizations. Committees
do not rely on third parties like judges when emerging controversies need to
be settled, although a "neutral" moderator may chair the meetings and sessions.
Participants or members are usually "experts", possibly assisted by supporters,
but not depending on them like laymen. Existing rules predominantly serve
to govern procedure and do not entail substantial regulations which enable
courts to come to binding decisions. Committees as organizations, however,
file, store and recall substantial decisions and actions taken in the past, which
can be invoked when new problems appear on the agenda.
Committees designed to resolve conflicts or to coordinate diverging positions
early12 employ various modes to terminate these processes. Consensus achieve-
ment or variants of majority voting, usually combined with some kind of
periodization of activities, are the most prominent ones. When committees not
only decide upon facts but issue norm-like judgements, they expect the address-
ees13 to comply. Consensus based decisions are easier to implement than those
in which a majority dominates. In constellations where no implementation or
policing agencies are available, it may become vital to reach a consensus.14
11 Conflict resolution thus can be regarded as some kind of ex post coordination,
as diverging positions, which early coordination would evade, have already
appeared.
12 Concentrating on these aspects shall not ignore the fact that many committees
are also or exclusively engaged in non-conflictive or less-conflictive screening
and brain-storming activities.
13 These are, at the least, the committee members themselves.
14 The concept of "closure", frequently used in studies of controversies to designate
the termination of a controversy, does not draw a clear distinction between a
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Moreover, as long as membership in a committee is voluntary and not remu-
nerated, only the rule of unanimity or of broad consensus will attract participa-
tion, especially when the "product" of a committee’s decision can benefit a
larger collectivity.
Whenever controversies arise, actors invest time and energy, they pursue differ-
ent strategies in discussions and negotiations on a certain subject, and at the
end - even when a broad consensus has been reached - there may be "winners"
and "losers". In this case, but also in uncontroversial matters, the requirement
for an actor to invest resources if he or she wants to participate coincides with
free-riding opportunities of non-participants, thus reducing the incentive for
voluntary participation (see Buchanan/ Tullock 1971: 43-130; Olson 1971: 33-65).
From the perspective of functional social differentiation, institutionalized coordi-
nation and conflict resolution on the basis of consensus seems to be most likely
when the controversies are organized along the lines of social differentiation,
which increases the concentration on a pure type of reasoning. The selective
institutionalization and organization of one "legitimate" type of reasoning gener-
ally facilitates decision-making on the basis of consensus substantially, because
competing interests emerging from other perspectives cannot officially be intro-
duced into a controversy.15 When, for example, different optional features of
a technology are discussed with respect to their compatibility with a larger
technological environment, the argument that option "A" fits better than "B"
because "A" is produced in democratic and "B" in authoritarian countries would
not be legitimate because it represents an inappropriate political argument in
the given situation. After a switch to political reasoning, however, a country’s
political constitution can be a relevant attribute, whereas specific features of
that country’s technical proposal will be widely ignored. The status of an argu-
ment as rational or at least legitimate depends on institutional and situational
circumstances.
In committee-work the abstraction from perspectives which institutionally
do not "fit" firstly increases the capacity to proceed on a consensual basis and
secondly facilitates reaching a consensus in a controversy. However, institu-
"decision" and its "acceptance" or stabilization. This latter aspect, which in com-
mittee standardization refers to the problem of implementation and diffusion
of a standard, must be regarded separately, because the mode of termination
can affect implementation. Therefore we refrain from using the term closure.
15 In an institutionalized pure type of reasoning "deviant" perspectives ideally
remain behind Rawls’ "veil of ignorance", and competing interests relying on
other perspectives do not even emerge.
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tions homogenize perspectives and not interests.16 A common view of a prob-
lem as political or economic will not automatically conciliate opposing political
or economic interests, but similar perspectives can facilitate what Elster, in a
vein akin to Habermas, calls "rational discussion", especially when the institu-
tional arrangement supports a problem-solving style of interaction and decision-
making (see Scharpf 1989).17
It might be challenging to relate our treatment of institutions, with respect to
types of reasoning, consensual processing of problems and termination of con-
troversies, to the more general subject of institutional differentiation and social
integration. When institutions internally homogenize perspectives and when
a pluralist society entails a multitude of institutions, a multitude of perspectives
co-exist. Whether this hampers or contributes to encompassing societal integra-
tion, however, must be discussed at another level of analysis. In our case, with
the focus on institutionalized processes such as standardization, a main achieve-
ment of institutionalization lies in the norms and rules and the corresponding
social selectivity designed to secure, within certain limits, homogeneity of per-
spectives and a pure type of reasoning. Therefore broader considerations as
to the possibility or the conditions of consensus when perspectives already
diverge go beyond the scope of our analysis.
Particularly in technology whose autonomous status "between science and
economy" remains somewhat ambiguous is it difficult to institutionally secure
homogeneity of perspectives and a pure type of reasoning. But it would be
misleading to directly infer comparatively high rates of dissensus from this
potential ambiguity. Moreover, a switch from one perspective to another, or
a mixture of perspectives, can even be helpful to escape from a deadlock into
which purely technically arguing actors may have maneuvered themselves.
Whether in this case technical reasons are replaced by economic or political
ones, or one of the latter perspectives is "translated" into technical reasoning,
16 The most prominent example is the institutionalization of the industrial ("class")
conflict in most industrialized countries. It, of course, does not eliminate this
conflict or harmonize the contradicting interests of both "classes", but it reduces
the conflict to a predominantly economic one. Here similar perspectives help
specify the conflicting interests.
17 "In rational discussion, the only thing supposed to count is the ’power of the
better argument’" (Elster 1989: 50/51). Problem-solving styles of interaction could
even be observed in the industrial conflict during the economic recession in the
1970s. In corporatist institutional arrangements "social contracts" between the
government, the trade unions and the trade associations were forged in order
to "control" prices and wages and to return to the path of economic growth (see
Schmidt 1989).
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depends on the constellation of actors, the flexibility of institutional rules and
on situational determinants. International standardization, nevertheless, offers
examples of consensus in the presence of diverging perspectives.18 The politi-
cal interest of a country in promoting its national solution as an international
standard can well be in harmony with the engineers’ position of some other
countries in prefering the same standard from a technical perspective as a good
solution for achieving compatibility. A standard which for some actors may
be attractive because of its economic efficiency may be preferred by others
because of its technical functionality. But in our institutionalized arena these
different interests typically have to be "translated" into the institutionally legiti-
mate type of reasoning; they are mediated and, for the most part, will not be
clearly expressed, as we will show when we discuss our standardization cases.
4. Institutionalized technical reasoning in international standardization
The International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT)
was founded in 1956 as part of the ITU.19 But its origins are much older. Al-
ready in 1865 a first organisation was founded by some European countries,
out of the need to deal with the technical issues of transborder telegraphy. In
continental Europe, telegraphy and later telephony was regarded in most coun-
tries as falling under the exclusive responsibility of the sovereign state. For a
long time, the interconnection of these separate national networks was the main
area of international technical coordination, as national networks themselves
were coordinated semi-hierarchically by the PTTs, the Post, Telegraph and
Telephone Administrations (Jones 1979). Only comparatively recently, with the
growing liberalization of telecommunications, the new variety in services and
the pace of technical change, has international standardization become increas-
ingly relevant also for the internal domestic network design. This has intensified
the need for technical coordination in the worldwide telecommunications sys-
tem, which requires that its different technical components and whole networks
have to interwork, despite the fact that their design, construction and operation
are under the control of multiple autonomous actors. But as we will see, this
growing relevance does not always facilitate international standardization,
18 In a recent article Schimank (1992) calls this type of agreement a "specific interest
consensus" suggesting that when perspectives ("orientations") differ, only the
possibility to agree on case-specific solutions will remain.
19 See Codding/ Rutkowski (1982) on the ITU, or Codding (1991) for a brief recent
overview. The ITU is the oldest, and with 174 member states, also the largest
international organization.
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which is still set in an institutional framework only partly adapted to the chang-
ing environment it operates in.
Successful technical coordination characteristically offers a common advantage
to all those involved in the production or usage of a large technical system.
To a large extent, standardization is a necessary precondition for the building
of international networks, which imply interdependencies between independent-
ly acting entities. Coordination among these actors is meant to result in a stan-
dard guiding the future development of networks. Coordinative aspects of stan-
dards make reference to the definition of interfaces, to protocol specifications
or to the determination of criteria for the compatibility of different connecting
devices. They typically treat technical artifacts as components of technical sys-
tems, and therefore address relational properties (see Schmidt/ Werle 1992b).
Like regulative standards, coordinative standards contain normative elements,
because they stipulate a certain degree of compliance from manufacturers and
developers of technology.20 Often more than one satisfactory solution to a co-
ordination problem is available. An international agreement on one solution
helps to prevent an evolutionary emergence and stabilization of different solu-
tions in different regions of the world (cf. Ullmann-Margalit 1977: 116; see also
Wärneryd 1990). Once different solutions have been implemented, measures
to achieve compatibility between regions will involve costs, and new coordina-
tive efforts are more likely to include distributive conflict.
From the beginning of institutionalized international coordination, there was
a pronounced connection between technical and political aspects, which was
reinforced in 1947 when the ITU became part of the newly founded United
Nations (UN), although the connection was always seen to be problematic.21
20 This, by the way, serves to make clear that standards, though formulated in rela-
tion to technical artifacts, are made to direct social action and not technical
functioning, because technical artifacts cannot act.
Regulative standards include safety instructions, quality specifications and mini-
mum or maximum requirements regarding noise, stability or use of energy. In
contrast to coordinative standards, they typically address technical artifacts as
stand-alone devices. Our focus here is exclusively on coordinative standards in
a larger systems context.
21 This was expressed, for example, by the Belgian delegate when the inclusion of
the ITU in the UN was discussed:
"Our Union is an essentially technical and administrative body and that, as a
result, international politics must continue to be excluded from its discussions.
Belgium is favourable to our Union being connected with the UN, but under
the formal stipulation that the complete independence of the ITU shall be main-
tained." (cited in Savage 1989: 39)
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The other side of this traditionally close relationship is a strong notion that
work on technical issues can be kept separate and independent from the for-
mally institutionalized risk of politicization.
The formal institutional structure of standardization in the CCITT is largely
determined by the larger framework of the ITU. The CCITT is one of 5 perma-
nent organs which operate semi-independently, i.e. within the overall budget
but under quasi-independent leadership (Codding/ Gallegos 1991). According
to the ITU’s convention22, the CCITT’s duties are "to study technical, operating
and tariff questions and to issue recommendations on them with a view to stan-
dardizing telecommunications on a world-wide basis."23 The legal status of
these recommendations is non-mandatory. Membership and voting rights are
nationally organized (one country, one vote), and formally the majority princi-
ple is the valid decision rule. Equally relevant are the detailed provisions re-
garding conferences, which in principle not only apply to the Plenary Assembly
of the CCITT but also to the meetings of its subgroups. The chairperson is
allocated the right to regulate the meeting in relation to its opening, agenda-
setting and closure, as well as having a policing function, regarding the content
of discussions. The authority is formally assigned to assure that arguments are
closely aligned to the technical purpose of the Union.
The operation of the CCITT is characterised by a hybrid hierarchical working
structure. The political mandate lies with the periodically (quadrennial) con-
vening Plenary Assembly (PA). This passes the recommendations resulting from
the last study period. It proceeds not on the principle of majority voting among
different alternatives but as a simple adoption or rejection of a suggested stan-
dard. The PA also formally allocates the questions to be studied in the follow-
ing period, as well as deciding on the number of chairpersons and study groups
(SGs). The technical work takes place in these groups and their subdivisions,
the working parties (WPs) and special rapporteurs’ groups (SpRs). Technical
issues are predominantly discussed and solved at this lowest level. Decisions
As Geser (1989: 338) shows, the careful avoidance of politicization and the large
membership are closely related; the technicality of issues has always facilitated
cooperation of diverse political systems in international organizations.
22 This was amended at the Plenipotentiary Conference in Nice in 1989 (ITU - Final
Acts 1990). Here the convention was split into a stable Constitution and the (non-
permanent) Convention. At an Additional Plenipotentiary in Geneva in December
1992 even more far-reaching changes were decided: the ITU is now reorganized
into three sectors (standardization, radio communications and development) with
the result that the CCITT does not really exist anymore. Fortunately, these
changes can be neglected for our purposes.
23 Constitution, Art. 13 II (ITU - Final Acts, 1990: 16).
18 MPIFG Discussion Paper 93/5
taken here are then referred up to the level of the WP and the SG as a whole.
If no opposition is mounted at these levels, the technical solutions are adopted
and will finally be referred up to the PA. Thus we have a path of rising politi-
cal decision competence and declining technical ’content’ competence (Dia-
gram 1).24
Membership rules affect the decision process and its outcome, and their selec-
CCITT Working Hierarchy
Plenary Assembly (PA)
Study Group (SG)
Working Party (WP)
Special Rapporteur’s Group (SpR)
Political Level
Technical Level
Diagram 1:
tivity directly impinges upon the inclusion of different types of reasoning. The
CCITT has traditionally been dominated by PTT members as holders of the
sovereign right of telecommunications operation. Of other interested parties,
it is mainly manufacturers who have participated - until recently only in an
advisory capacity - under the category of scientific and industrial organisations
(SIOs).25 They now have to pay membership fees which, added to the direct
costs of their unpaid participation, restrict the circle of those partaking from
the start. With their partly exclusive technical knowledge and the intensity of
their input at the level of the technical groups, the SIOs could generally realize
a de facto impact on standardization. Yet given the nationally structured nature
24 This institutionalized separation of the political from the technical sphere has
increased in proportion to the technical complexity and the pace of technical
change, coupled with the growing number of participants involved. This has
made it impracticable to take diverging decisions as to the subject matter from
the level of the SG to the PA. If dissent still arises, it is therefore only possible
to refer the issues back to the appropriate SpR, at the cost of the corresponding
delay of the technical solution (Irmer 1990).
25 SIOs were granted full membership status in the CCITT in 1989 (Final Acts 1990).
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of the decision-making, the inclusion of a wider range of participants formally
affects only the extent of internal coordination in delegations, so that the grow-
ing environmental heterogeneity of telecommunications is reflected only insuffi-
ciently. The influence of SIOs depends to some extent on the procurement
power network operators are able to exert. The principle of nationally organized
votes thus transforms standardization into a two-level game, common in inter-
national politics (Putnam 1988). Interests are aggregated twice, nationally and
internationally, which may also suggest that national technical conditions are
likely to receive more weight, particularly if there is asymmetric influence of
the network operator.26 Furthermore, professional homogeneity of participants
is significant. The technical purpose of the CCITT leads to the sending of techni-
cal personnel, which feeds back a generally technical and often shared perspec-
tive on the task.
A comprehensive set of informal rules partly complements and partly replaces
the formal rules. The consensus principle, guiding the CCITT’s work despite
the formal majority rule, is the most relevant.27 Its importance is bound up
with the difficulty of sanctioning "deviance" in the international realm. A con-
sensual decision adds weight to the non-binding recommendation and makes
a widespread adoption more probable (Renaud 1990: 41). The implementation
of standards is entirely separate from their definition, and the CCITT neither
monitors nor keeps track informally of the degree of compliance. The voluntary
nature of standards facilitates consensus as national delegations can agree at
no economic cost, as long as no specific contrary interests exist. Although con-
sensus is not identical with unanimity28, certain dissenting opinions would
never be overruled. A consensus would not be declared if, for example, one
of the major industrialized countries, who are a focus of the international com-
munications flow, rejected a draft recommendation. An informal ranking of
countries can be observed.
Informal rules serve to balance conflicting private interests with the joint inter-
est in a coordinated solution. They assure that the decision process and its
26 The increasing relevance and participation of multinationals clearly shows the
ambiguity of this principle. Interests of corporations like IBM cannot be "framed"
in a national context. The question is interesting if national representation inhibits
their influence in international standardization, or rather increases it since these
firms have a "say" in different national delegations.
27 This does not mean that the formal majority rule is as a result obsolete. Rather,
its presence as a last resort is likely to speed up decision-making. That no formal
votes are taken, moreover, facilitates agreement, because open commitment to
a specific position is not necessary.
28 Hawkins (1992: 343) emphasizes that, typically, a 70% majority suffices.
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outcome are perceived as being fair, by providing room for the participants
to defend private technical and economical interests alongside national ones.
The need to reconcile divergent individual positions despite the common inter-
est in coordination has grown as a consequence of the greater heterogeneity
of participants. For example, agreement is facilitated by the fact that it is impos-
sible to veto work where one has not participated. Otherwise, work could be
obstructed at the level of the Plenary Assembly after years of effort to reach
a compromise in the committees. If single participants violate informal rules
and obstruct work unnecessarily, there is the formal political level as the last
resort: the leader of the delegation to which the disruptive person belongs can
be asked to attend to their (his/her) behaviour. In the extreme case, members
can face exclusion from the delegation and thus the CCITT.
Up to a point, the institutionalized restriction on technical argumentation facili-
tates consensus because a common perspective is given. Although a decision
may be partly motivated on political or economic grounds, these interests must
be translatable into technical reasons. However, when economic interests in
particular gain high significance, they cannot be neglected in an organization
whose decisions, though technical, have a bearing on market opportunities and
profits. With dominant economic interests being in evidence, but not institution-
ally channelled to any extent, technical reasoning can face "overload" problems
with respect to heterogeneity of argumentation and disparity of interests.
With the expansion of heterogeneous membership and interests in technical
standardization, distributive conflicts have become more likely. Consensus then
is dependent on the prior solution of such conflicts. With the selective focus
on formal political or technical reasoning, the CCITT’s institutional framework
lacks provisions for these cases. At best, "pure" technical controversies can be
solved by invoking an upper-level "political" decision to be abided by at the
lower level. Over and above that the CCITT must and usually can rely on the
expectation that participants will in general behave cooperatively in view of
the continuing need for technical coordination (March/ Olsen 1989: 21-52). This
long term perspective can facilitate other common solutions to distributive
conflict, but they are not formally institutionalized.29 Package deals, where
participants swap consent ("I agree to your teletex, if you agree to my video-
tex"), seem to be the solution which is realized relatively often, despite the
probable difficulty in finding commensurable trading issues. Also turn taking,
where the ego surrenders its turn knowing that the alter ego will take the turn
29 ’Distributive’ conflicts in this context are not constrained to economic controver-
sies, but also relate to non-pecuniary gains and losses. See Scharpf (1992: 65-75)
for a detailed discussion of the conditions for side payments and package deals.
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next time, is a possibility since the most influential actors in CCITT-committees
are long term participants. Side payments, finally, are least likely in an organi-
zation in which economic argumentation is also informally banned.
Summarizing the, in our view, most significant aspects of standardization proce-
dures in the CCITT, we want to stress their alignment towards consensus where
controversies may arise. Legitimate arguments are confined to technical prob-
lems with a theoretical possibility of mobilizing politics as a last resort. Formal
and informal rules leave little room for other orientations. Scientific reasoning
seems to be acceptable as long as it contributes to clarifying or deciding specific
technical disputes. "Theoretical" argumentation, however, tends to be rejected.
With respect to economic reasoning, the situation is more complicated. Econom-
ic arguments and interests appear almost illegitimate. For a long period of time
the rather homogeneous membership of the CCITT and the focus on standards
for transborder communication facilitated a concentration on technical reason-
ing. Recently, as our case studies show, this has become more difficult.
5. Controversies: Some Illustrations
In the following, two standardization processes will be analysed with regard
to the way economic, political and scientific perspectives "invade" technical rea-
soning. Although we concentrate on controversies, the "usual" procedure at the
CCITT is smooth: sometimes slow, sometimes fast, but not highly contentious.
For the most part of its operation, the legitimate technical reasoning "absorbs"
the other perspectives, so that economic, political or scientific interests become
undetectable, since they are fully "translated" into technical arguments. It is in
controversies that these "hidden" agendas are revealed and can be analysed.
We will begin with a description of the standardization of Interactive videotex,
a standardization process that is distinctive in the extent of confrontation moti-
vated by a compound of political and economic interests. It was the first - and
up to now only - time where the CCITT experienced difficulties similar to the
"Colour-TV War" (Crane 1978) or the current debate surrounding HDTV within
the other ITU consultative committee, the CCIR (Cave/ Shurmer 1990). Coordi-
nation gains were here overshadowed by distributive conflicts. This entire
confrontation will be contrasted, secondly, with the standardization of Telefax.
For most of its history this process was uneventful, and only recently have
political and economic perspectives interfered with technical reasoning. To a
great extent, as a result of standardization, the "career" of both technological
systems has differed considerably.
22 MPIFG Discussion Paper 93/5
5.1 Interactive Videotex
In the late 1970s Videotex, the access to computers via telephone networks
employing user-friendly terminals, became a central topic of the telecommunica-
tion agenda in the leading industrialized countries. Their national PTTs were
"looking for new services to increase the traffic in their existing telecommunica-
tion networks and for new follow-up products for the time when the telephone
expansion would reach its saturation point" (Schneider et al. 1991: 190). Some
national governments were, furthermore, concerned with the support of the
consumer electronics and computer industry. In 1977/78 when Britain (Prestel),
France (Antiope) and Canada (Telidon) initiated international standardization
of videotex, each introducing their own system’s concept to the CCITT in turn,
each system’s development was already well advanced and on the point of
implementation. More significantly, each country had pronounced interests in
seeing its system as the world standard. This concerned hopes for a large equip-
ment market with low terminal costs - aspirations here focussed especially on
the USA (Ford 1979). Alongside these economic interests of terminal manufac-
turers, which were supported by industrial policy, there were strong wider
political interests. In the context of rising discussions about the coming "Infor-
mation Society", Britain and France in particular thought it a matter of national
prestige to see their systems proposals become world standards. Also involved
was their ambition to see a European development succeed, despite the US
American dominance in computing.
The initial discussions ended with a preliminary recommendation ("S.100") in
1980, which merely described all three systems with respect to coding conven-
tions and a few other technical elements. Meanwhile the USA had announced
that it would possibly present its own systems development to the CCITT at
a later date. Even this first agreement, with its character more akin to an im-
passe than an emergent compromise, had been difficult to reach. Britain, in
what was, for the CCITT, an unusual move of direct confrontation, had
demanded at the last meeting that Telidon be deleted from the official recom-
mendation. The other countries then had to take a stand. Interestingly here,
France supported Canada and even mobilized Germany and Sweden to do the
same, by threatening to otherwise obstruct these countries’ teletex standardiza-
tion efforts.30 Behind this was France’s desire to damage Britain who was per-
ceived as the real competitor, although technically there was more similarity
30 This could not be articulated as a contribution to a technical debate concentrating
on Videotex. During informal meetings, coffee breaks etc., however, France had
the opportunity to establish these connections and make arrangements for a
package deal.
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between Antiope and Prestel than with Telidon (Savage 1989: 203).31 Though
these technical similarities and differences were examined and discussed in the
meetings, this had little impact on the virtual standstill of the decision-making
process.
Standardization continued in the next study period. Here Canada succeeded
in merging Telidon with the US proposal into a system called NAPLPS. This
gave it a lead over France and Britain.32 The study period ended in 1984, again
with a recommendation ("T.100") that included several incompatible options
(NAPLPS, the European CEPT standard and a Japanese system). Even after 1984
there was the aim to reach a compromise with the Recommendation "T.101".
Finally, the conflict subsided not because a satisfactory common solution had
been found, but because the actors had been disappointed in the scale of their
political and economic expectations.
This failure of Videotex itself was, to a significant extent, caused by the unsuc-
cessful standardization that had transpired. Because of persistent incompatibili-
ties, the chance for cheap terminals in an international market and for transbor-
der services was foregone. The continued attempts to reach an agreement,
moreover, added insecurity on all sides as to how far investment into the sys-
tem would not become obsolete with a new standard. Videotex is thus an exam-
ple of heterogeneity overload where the institutional framework could not cope
with "breaking" the conflict into something manageable. What does this contro-
versy reveal about the characteristic operation of the CCITT when significant
political and economic interests are present?
From a technical point of view, the existing functional commonalities between
the systems proposals were broad. Each system conceptualized a similar combi-
nation of data bases with telecommunication links, and a TV-oriented terminal
device, providing a reasonable basis to attempt standardization. Moreover,
committee standardization is the "normal" procedure in telecommunications
for realizing international interoperability and services. Once such standardiza-
tion started, however, it could not easily be stopped because the CCITT lacks
an institutional provision for ending unsuccessful standardization efforts. This
mirrors the institutionalized principle that one single ("the best") technical solu-
31 Telidon and NAPLPS are geometric systems while both Prestel and Antiope are
alphamosaic, albeit they use different coding methods (serial versus parallel).
32 In contrast to these countries, Canada’s only aim at the CCITT was to be set on
a par with the others, as one standard option among the rest. At the same time,
however, it tried to dominate the North American market in a de facto way and
achieved this aim with NAPLPS (Savage 1989: 203).
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tion should always be agreed on and that the CCITT is the only organization
capable of providing the necessary coordination for international telecommuni-
cations. When no formal consensus can be reached on where to stop, each party
with stakes has to continue. A one-sided exit would pose the danger that anoth-
er national proposition may be adopted, or of a possible compromise between
the remaining actors. The work itself has to be based on technical reasoning,
protracting the search for a compromise when the primary interests are political
and economic. Each country can only continue to praise the technical merits
of its system to protect these hidden interests.
In the concrete case presented here, Britain and France first had to overcome
their perception of being in direct competition. As long as both aimed at world
market domination and national honour, they were in an "all or nothing"
situation, with no common gains and nothing to compromise on. Mutual gains
from coordination only became apparent when the context changed: the suc-
cessful North American agreement on NAPLPS in 1982 added enough external
pressure for them to realize that there were common interests. It was then
feared that North American manufacturers could overtake the European market
in a de facto way, with cheap terminals, if the fragmented situation persisted.
The conflict between the UK and France was finally settled within a (former)
European standardization organization, the CEPT.33 This fact illustrates well
how the institutional split between technical and political reasoning allows the
technical working groups to interpret all conflicts as "political", attributing them
to external sources, while the search for the best technical solution is allowed
to continue. Videotex standardization had already started in CEPT in 1977.
Once there was the political will to reach a compromise, Britain and France
were both faced with sunk costs and commitment at home, while there was
no provision to negotiate these economic stakes. Months and months of techni-
cal discussions finally led to the realization that technical differences between
Britain and France were not that great (Childs 1982). In the so called CEPT
standard that resulted, both national standards were included as options within
the larger context of a general path of future technical migration. Similar to the
international level, where the CCITT had agreed on the enumerative listing of
different incompatible options, the CEPT standard was no real solution. In view
of fixed positions, it established commonality at a higher level of technical
abstraction, by delineating a joint future path of technical development. With
both the CCITT and CEPT, the resulting compromise made for an institutional
33 In every important respect, the CEPT’s institutional framework is similar enough
to CCITT, besides being limited to 24 European countries and being under the
almost exclusive control of the respective 24 PTTs.
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settlement of the controversy or, at least, a means of surmounting the predomi-
nant difficulties. But none of the standards were implemented; they did not
have the potential to effect the necessary technical coordination and, moreover,
came much too late. While negotiations in committees thus failed, in the alterna-
tive institutional context of the market, clear guidelines for coordination ("mar-
ket standards") did not result either. In the competition of the different national
systems, none achieved a large enough network to sustain at least the national
technical development without significant government subsidization as in the
French case.
5.2 Telefax
Against this conflict-ridden standardization process of Videotex, the standard-
ization of Telefax is almost a counter example. Telefax standardization had
started in the early 1960s, directly provoked by the perceived need for an inter-
national standard. At the time firm-specific fax standards existed, limiting com-
munication to machines of the same brand. Once started, standardization pro-
gressed smoothly, resulting first in the Group 1 standard (6 minutes per page),
followed by the Group 2 standard in 1976 which had reduced transmission time
by 50%. Economic and political interests in this technical development were
almost absent, the technical principle dated back to the last century and expec-
tations of a wide diffusion did not exist. The lack of interest almost led to a
dissolution of the responsible study group and a discontinuance of the work
in the early 1970s.
Still, interest did not sink below a certain threshold, with the result that work
could continue, still uninhibited by non-technical considerations. New technical
possibilities made a Group 3 standard with a mere 1-minute-per-page transmis-
sion time feasible. Once started, Telefax standardization thus progressed, orien-
ted to the optimization of this single design-characteristic transmission speed.
A difficulty which emerged in the work for the Group 3 standard illustrates
how problems are processed at the CCITT under such ideal conditions.
Several alternatives existed when a coding method for the Group 3 Telefax had
to be chosen, whereas there was an absence of decisive technical, political or
economic criteria. In this case, the decision on the Modified Huffman Code
(MHC) was reached with the help of several tests of the different methods
available, i.e. in a scientific-experimental way. Though scientific reasoning is
not formally accommodated in the institutional framework, neither is it infor-
mally barred, probably due to the close relationship between the scientific and
the technical fields. It is unproblematic, as this decision demonstrates, if it
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merely supplements and assists technical work, drawing up a decision amongst
alternatives.34
Larger controversies where non-technical perspectives were relevant only oc-
curred after the significant commercial success of Telefax. The rapid diffusion
which took off in the early 1980s with the new Group 3 standard had been
completely unexpected. Forecasts of new service growth at the time focussed
entirely on Teletex and Videotex. And yet the astonishing success could not
have happened without prior standardization; after all committee standardiza-
tion had only started on the basis of the limits of a brand-only compatibility.
Of further significance was the requirement, imposed by some countries and
fulfilled by most manufacturers, for Group 3 machines to be downwards com-
patible with Group 2. This increased security and trust in the development,
and thus helped enlarge the network of users. Such features were significantly
absent in Videotex with its many incompatibilities.
A small controversy which arose in the mid-1980s shows how formally illegiti-
mate political lobbying might assume the role of side payments and thereby
overcome economic conflicts that prevent technical coordination. The controver-
sy concerned the decision to adopt an Error Correction Mode (ECM) for the
Group 3 Telefax standard. British manufacturers (which licensed Japanese ma-
chines) wanted ECM standardized, to improve the service and thus increase
the demand for machines. Japanese manufacturers, in contrast, preferred to
keep their proprietary methods. Finally, the British Government got the Japa-
nese Government’s consent that Japan would not block the ECM standardiza-
tion in the CCITT.35
This conflict was only minor but shows how, in the context of rising expecta-
tions, non-technical perspectives infiltrate technical reasoning in standardization.
An unusually large controversy was faced in the standardization of Telefax in
the last study period ending at the beginning of 1993. With its exceptionality
34 Whenever scientific reasoning competes with existing technical, economic or
political interests, it is less likely to be recognized. People from universities or
the PTT research centers in particular are often regarded as promoting solutions
that are too scientific to be usuable for practitioners. Interestingly, commercially
unsuccessful standards are often labeled "too theoretical", just as unsuccessful
standardization was "too political".
35 In contrast to political lobbying, which can bring about a decision and overcome
a deadlock, it will obviously not be guided by an economic rationale. While side
payments can lead to an outcome that is efficient in the Kaldor sense, a politically
struck compromise need not even realize Pareto effiency. See Scharpf (1992: 57)
for both concepts.
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and duration it reveals well the CCITT’s characteristic processing of different
types of reasoning.
The controversy started with the British proposal to standardize a Group 3
terminal for digital networks, made possible through a minor adaptation of
the existing Group 3 standard for analogue networks. The problem is, however,
that a Group 4 standard has already existed for digital networks and particular-
ly the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) since 1984. The Group 4
deviates from the technical principles embodied in Group 3. Instead of being
constrained to a stand-alone terminal with ideosyncratic coding and printing
technology like Group 3, Group 4 is a much more principled solution. It is
based on the new Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) architecture, applicable
to all sorts of communication (data, text, voice) in digital networks. This is an
abstract standards architecture specifying common principles which, if imple-
mented, will impose comparable structures and allow compatibility between
different subsystems.
The controversy surrounding the British proposal, which was quickly backed
by a similar suggestion from the USA and had the support of the former USSR,
can thus be interpreted as a conflict with a genuine technical trait, revolving
around the question of overall architectural orientation. Against the principled
but complicated OSI solution, the new proposal was based on the evolved
telephone network architecture as a frame of reference for choosing between
technical options or for a guided search to achieve a certain functionality. Thus,
it had the pragmatic capacity to produce a faster fax - like Group 4 - in a chea-
per, less principled and more ideosyncratic way.
The proposal was fiercely opposed by a coalition of countries, most of all
France, Germany and Japan, joined by some smaller countries acting out of
(tacit) political allegiance. They wanted to keep the existing Group 4 standard
unrivalled, and rejected the declared superiority of the Group 3 digital stan-
dard. It could not be cheaper, they argued, at least not if it was to achieve the
same performance. What is more, the Group 4 standard had existed for some
time, several manufacturers had sunk investment in it, and some machines were
already in use.
Once a standard has been recommended by the CCITT, it cannot be changed
or even replaced by a different technical alternative. It was therefore impossible
to suggest that the new proposal be simply used instead of the Group 4 stan-
dard. This stability of recommendations protects the long term confidence in
the work of the CCITT. In a controversy this institutionalized principle provides
a legitimate argument to oppose new proposals without having to refer to
detailed technical or economic reasons. From this point of view, a second op-
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tional standard impedes the development of technological systems and worsens
their economic prospects. The high degree of self-commitment can also be seen
as the only institutional safeguard protecting economic interests and invest-
ments. Arguments about costs and general efficiency, sunk investment and
installed base of machines are only allowed at a very general level. Precise
figures are not given at the CCITT in order to give the work a technical, rather
than an economic focus, thereby furthering the search for the most appropriate
technical solution instead of the most profitable one.
Only a limited range of technical arguments was therefore exchanged. More-
over, it was apparent that both sides differed in their assessment of possible
parallel standards for the next generation of Telefax: while the promoters of
a Group 3 digital standard believed the market would cope and that two coex-
isting standards offered a positive choice for consumers, the opponents regard-
ed two standards as dangerous for the future development of Telefax. A further
standard would imply that there were incompatibilities between the different
standards and could cause insecurity in the market, which so far was based
on the ease of interoperability of Telefax.
These different evaluations, similar to the two existing architectural orientations,
were incommensurable and thus incapable of negotiation. The CCITT had no
institutional means to surmount this deadlock, besides re-opening discussions
at subsequent meetings to see if positions had changed. Important hidden
economic, political or simply personal interests were attributed by the partici-
pants to be the cause of the conflict. For example, it was said that the US pro-
motion of the Group 3 digital was the attempt to break the Japanese dominance
in the production of Telefax equipment, and that there were overall trade inter-
ests involved. The opposition of France and Germany was ascribed to the pur-
chase of a large order of Group 4 machines, while Japanese firms, some be-
lieved, were secretly developing the digital Group 3 machine but could not
promote it openly since the Japanese delegation leader would loose face, were
Group 4 given up. Such accounts were matched by the suspicion that Group
3 digital really lacked any fundamental backing. The British person who had
first promoted it - interestingly employed by a Japanese firm in England, which
added more confusion - only wanted to prove he still had ideas, it was said.
In the US, the other strong proponent, likewise one person was seen to be re-
sponsible. He - a consultant to AT&T - merely prolonged work on this subject
as a way to extend his contract.
Such and similar interests were attributed to each other amongst the partici-
pants. If, on the one hand, they could have been negotiated openly, side pay-
ments, for example, could have been used if sunk investment really stood in
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the way of adopting a "superior" Group 3 digital standard. On the other hand,
the institutional limitation on technical reasoning clearly transferred all other
possible interests to the realm of speculation, furthering the concentration on
the openly technical aspects. This facilitates consensus, as most arguments are
screened out as illegitimate; they may be relevant as a means of attributing and
explaining actors’ behaviour, but they are not allowed to have an explicit bear-
ing on the CCITT’s operation. Changing positions in international trade,
manufacturers’ competition or industrial policy are not meant to affect the
course of international standardization. In Telefax, therefore, only the legitimate
procedural rules could be employed to achieve an agreement. In this situation,
the proponents of Group 4 made the attempt to oust the Group 3 digital with
a compromise proposal for a Group 3 standard using Group 4 protocols (UDI),
which would be less harmful to the Group 4 developments. However, this strat-
egy failed as the compromise was not accepted. The way the debate was then
closed is highly interesting.
After the controversy had to some extent blocked other work for a study peri-
od, a conclusive decision was deemed necessary. Not being able to progress
with technical arguments, the political level of the CCITT was activated. All
delegation leaders participating in the responsible SG VIII were called to a
meeting to draw up an agreement. The "technical people" had to abide by the
decision. Here both the Group 3 digital and the UDI proposal were accepted
as new options to the Group 3 standard, to coexist with Group 4. Thus, what
was introduced as an attempt to restrict the number of options as far as possi-
ble, the UDI proposal, became in the end an additional option. The way this
controversy ended nicely illustrates how institutional constraints and process
dynamics may combine to generate a new standard, which need not actually -
as UDI demonstrates - have any real backing. Moreover, together with the other
coexisting standards, namely the old Group 3, the old Group 4, and the new
Group 3 digital, UDI may have the effect of causing the technical development
of Telefax systems to run completely out of the CCITT’s control.
6. Conclusion
Technical coordination is a specific aspect of technical development. It refers
to the problem that, at least in a non-hierarchical constellation, autonomous
actors must take into consideration what others do when they design, manufac-
ture, operate and, sometimes even, when they use different components of a
more comprehensive technical system. Network technologies like telecommuni-
cation networks obviously require such coordination, which compatibility stan-
dards are designed to facilitate. Although a means of technical coordination,
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the definition of the several features of a standard can be motivated and influ-
enced by other than "pure" technical concerns.
Theories of functional and institutional social differentiation offer criteria to
distinguish social systems on the basis of not only their structural, but also their
institutional, cognitive, normative and action-related aspects. Building on these
theories and on empirical studies of technical development, we introduce a dis-
tinction between technical, economic, political and scientific perspectives. These
perspectives typically guide actions in the international standardization of
telecommunications.
Whether or not these perspectives can directly affect standard-setting processes
depends to a great extent on institutional and organizational factors. In telecom-
munications a considerable amount of international standardization is concen-
trated in the CCITT. Membership and decision rules, but equally rules regard-
ing the legitimacy of different types of reasoning, govern the work of the stan-
dardization committees in this international organization. Technical reasoning
is the officially most appropriate form in standard-setting. The institutionalized
requirement to abstract from non-technical perspectives facilitates standardiza-
tion. Scientific, economic and political interests have to be translated into techni-
cal reasoning, establishing a common denominator for negotiations. The range
of valid arguments is restricted. The extent to which actors’ motivations are
non-technical is a matter for speculation and as such is dismissed as irrelevant
for the work of the CCITT.
Only in exceptionally few cases does the CCITT’s normally smooth operation,
secured through the institutionalization of technical reasoning, fail. Typically
the problems result from recent technical, economic and political-regulative
changes in international telecommunications. In such cases, every participant
is still interested in having a common standard, but as the benefits of different
options are distributed unequally, the actors reveal strong preferences for differ-
ent solutions. With the consensus principle being standard operating procedure
of the committees, the actors risk ending up without a standard at all. Such
dilemmatic situations, as yet still infrequent, have become more relevant for
the CCITT. In the broader controversies emerging, one can discern the limits
of mechanisms absorbing non-technical perspectives or translating them into
technical perspectives.
But in the exemplary analysis of standardization processes at the CCITT, we
can also see that officially pure technical controversies can sometimes be
brought to a conclusion when an institutionally "deviant" perspective is intro-
duced. Besides the formally accepted means of this intergovernmental organiza-
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tion coming to a political solution as a last resort, scientific arguments are ac-
cepted informally as a neutral way of reasoning. In other instances, "hidden"
economic, political or even idiosyncratic interests remain obscure. But their
translation into technical reasons makes it possible that negotiations in specific
cases result in agreement.
Finally, there are rare cases, as Videotex standardization vividly demonstrates,
where political or economic perspectives dominate to an extent which technical
reasoning cannot absorb any more. Under these circumstances, the CCITT’s
operation is blocked. Interaction turns uncooperative as the prevailing hidden
interests cannot be exposed and dealt with openly. In these cases of heterogene-
ity overload, the restriction on the technical perspective leads to practically
irrelevant ceremonies of technical reasoning. Institutionalized provisions to
handle this kind of situation, like authorized discussions on side payments to
overcome economic conflicts, are not available. Thus standardization fails, and
the development of a technical system can be neither technically nor otherwise
coordinated and controlled by the CCITT. However, an institutionalization of
additional instruments for these cases would need to take into account that the
normal successful operation of the CCITT builds on the abstraction from non-
technical arguments.
Our emphasis on problems of technical coordination and the role of institutions
in the coordination process points to crucial elements of a theory of technologi-
cal development which are missing in most social constructivist approaches
in the sociology of technology. We have tried to show how institutionalized
rules and procedures of standardization can shape technological systems. Inter-
national standardization is one important phase in the development of telecom-
munication networks and services, determining to some extent their future
existence and success. The standardization processes demonstrate, we argue,
that institutions generally privilege and stabilize selectively a certain - in our
case a technical - perspective and a corresponding type of reasoning, which
is clearly distinguished from non-technical perspectives. The latter are never
absent, but through translation they are often accommodated to the institutional
context. Institutional frames thus influence the way actors coordinate technolog-
ical developments and, in doing so, they shape technical systems. This institu-
tional embeddedness of individual action has to be taken into account if
constructivist explanations are to escape the charge of voluntarism.
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